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ones. For each essay Achinstein provides a re-
sponse.
The quality of the contributed papers is even.
Most authors provide a reasonable summation
of that aspect of Achinstein’s work they intend
to engage with. Given the number of essays in
the volume, it is not surprising that Achinstein’s
responses are short (typically about two pages).
Inevitably this leaves some authors’ objections
and queries unanswered, perhaps indicating that
a volume with fewer contributions and lengthier
responses would have been more useful. In fair-
ness, however, Achinstein often directs readers
toward relevant papers of his that address criti-
cisms in more detail. Furthermore, the intent of
the volume is not, nor should be, a defense of or
introduction to Achinstein’s ideas. (A second
volume, Evidence, Explanation, and Realism,
also published by Oxford University Press
[2010], collects many of Achinstein’s previ-
ously published papers and is therefore a better,
and worthwhile, introduction to his mature phil-
osophical views. The two volumes complement
each other very well.)
Not all papers are directly concerned with
historical issues, but enough are to make Phi-
losophy of Science Matters beneficial to any
historian who is interested in methodological
issues, the history of their evolution, or their role
in shaping scientific debates. Jordi Cat is con-
cerned with Achinstein’s interpretation of Max-
well’s methodology; Victor Di Fate discusses
Newton’s Rules of Philosophy, Achinstein’s sym-
pathy for them, and their plausibility; Frederick
Kronz also writes on Newton’s views on induc-
tion, as well as Mill’s, and Achinstein’s interpre-
tation of each; Gregory Morgan challenges Achin-
stein’s construal of William Whewell’s ideas on
coherence within theoretical science; Stathis Psil-
los and Bas van Fraassen discuss Achinstein’s
analysis of Perrin’s experimental work and the
conclusions Achinstein draws for purposes of ad-
vancing the scientific realism debate. These essays
each follow Achinstein’s example of careful, his-
torically informed philosophy of science; histori-
ans interested in such issues will certainly profit.
DAVID HARKER
Raymond Tallis. Aping Mankind: Neuromania,
Darwinitis, and the Misrepresentation of Hu-
manity. xi  388 pp., bibl., index. Durham,
U.K.: Acumen, 2011. €25 (cloth).
Raymond Tallis’s excessively long and jumbled
book criticizes the neuroevolutionary explana-
tions for human behavior and culture that have
become fashionable since the 1990s. From neu-
roanthropology to neurotheology, the “neuro-”
prefix signals the application of neuroscience
(chiefly, neuroimaging) to topics hitherto re-
searched with the tools of the humanities and
social sciences. Tallis, whom an editor of Wiki-
pedia describes as “a British philosopher, secu-
lar humanist, poet, novelist, cultural critic, and
retired medical doctor,” attacks what others
have dubbed “neurobabble,” “neuromythology,”
“neurospeculation,” “neurotrash,” or “neuro-
madness.” Like “neuromania,” these epithets
signal irritation and revolt; Tallis expresses
them too, but the scorn with which he some-
times does so ends up vitiating his polemic.
The neuroscientist Susan Greenfield’s asser-
tion that “our identity is our brain” (quoted on p.
30) encapsulates the neuroevolutionary perspec-
tive on the human. This perspective extends to
the totality of human collective experience in
space and time, including consciousness, art,
science, politics, and religion. Since evolution
has shaped brains, neuromania naturally com-
bines with the attempt to explain everything
pertaining to living organisms in terms of evo-
lutionary advantage. More than other critics,
Tallis highlights this convergence, and that is
valuable in itself.
Aping Mankind, however, is weak on history,
which it outlines “from Hippocrates to the
BOLD Rush.” “BOLD” designates the Blood-
Oxygen-Level-Dependent signals measured by
neuroimaging, usually interpreted (in the neuro-
manic universe) as neural correlates of behav-
iors and capacities. With many other scholars by
now, Tallis sketches the methodological prob-
lems and conceptual fallacies involved in such
interpretation. He also shows how neuromania
lapses from correlations to causes and con-
founds necessary with sufficient conditions.
Right on target (though often too quick) on
those points, he fails in his genealogy of the
belief that we are our brains. Hippocrates wrote
that “from the brain, and from the brain only,
arise our pleasures, joys, laughter and jests, as
well as our sorrow, pains, griefs and tears” (quoted
on p. 29). For Tallis, the Greek doctor claimed that
the brain “is the whole story” (p. 30)—and thus
anticipated Francis Crick’s “astonishing hypothe-
sis” by twenty-five hundred years. His narrative
ignores immense differences—the first one being
that “brain” meant fundamentally different things
for Hippocrates and Crick. Although Aping Man-
kind is not supposed to be history, we can still
regret that its historical perspective corresponds,
though with a negative valence, to neuroscientists’
own presentist stories.
Most of Tallis’s objections will be familiar to
those acquainted with discussions around the
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neuroevolutionary enterprise: the circularity of
experimental designs and argumentative strate-
gies; the truistic character of empirical results
and their interpretation; the lack of ecological
validity of most studies; the inherent incapacity
to explain consciousness by reduction; the irrel-
evance of most neuroevolutionary research for
the objects it allegedly examines—cultural dif-
ferences for neuroanthropology, beauty for neu-
roaesthetics, spiritual experience for neurotheol-
ogy. These self-undermining features will not
go away with more sophisticated methodologies
or more powerful scanners but are intrinsic to
the neuroevolutionary ideology. While Tallis’s
explanation of why this is so may be unclear, it
constitutes a salutary wake-up call for the humanities.
Indeed, if the neuroevolutionary perspective
is so inane, and if it is so obvious that we are
persons and not brains, why care? The reason
may be that the “capitulation to scientism” (p.
343) is penetrating the human sciences them-
selves. The belief that these sciences can eventu-
ally be replaced by their “neuro” varieties presup-
poses an epistemic and institutional hierarchy that
leaves them at the bottom—and ultimately out. In
defending the humanities against becoming “ani-
malities” (p. 59), Tallis, who describes himself as
a secular humanist, insists that he is not against
neuroscience or evolution, but only against their
misuses. In contrast, the philosopher Daniel Den-
nett sees him as indulging in “refutation by cari-
cature” and “as a sort of outraged defender of an
obsolete worldview that’s losing ground fast”
(Marc Parry, “Raymond Tallis Takes Out the
‘Neurotrash,’” Chronicle of Higher Education, 9
Oct. 2011, http://chronicle.com/article/Raymond
-Tallis-Takes-Out-the/129279/ [accessed 3 Feb.
2011]). Such disparaging comments perfectly il-
lustrate the passionate dialogue de sourds of which
Aping Mankind represents one side. For historians
of science, it is such speaking and working at
cross-purposes that in itself constitutes a fascinat-
ing object of study, yet to be fully understood.
FERNANDO VIDAL
Derek Turner. Paleontology: A Philosophical
Introduction. (Cambridge Introductions to Phi-
losophy of Biology.) xi  227 pp., illus., tables,
bibl., index. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011. $28 (paper).
Derek Turner’s new book is a highly serviceable
introduction to traditional problems in the meta-
physics and epistemology of science as they
arise in paleontology. As part of the new Cam-
bridge University Press series “Cambridge In-
troductions to Philosophy of Biology,” the book
is targeted toward nonspecialists and is written
in clear and jargon-free prose. Turner is uncon-
cerned with fancy philosophical maneuvers; his
goal is to highlight the fascinating intellectual
landscape that characterizes modern paleontol-
ogy. Mission accomplished.
The discipline of paleontology is awash with
researchers who gravitate toward unconven-
tional perspectives. This tendency has made for
an exciting modern social and conceptual his-
tory of paleontology, but historians and philos-
ophers of science have generally not taken no-
tice. Turner is one of a very few philosophers
working today who specializes in philosophical
features of paleontological science.
While some philosophers of science are con-
tent with inventing and relieving fine-grained
conceptual tensions that succeed in annoying
rather than educating scientists and historians,
Turner is not among them. His general ap-
proach, masterfully executed in Paleontology: A
Philosophical Introduction, is to take histori-
cally significant topics in paleontology and sub-
ject them to philosophical scrutiny. By staying
close to the actual science and showing how
many debates in paleontology (and between pa-
leontology and other biological disciplines) turn
on distinctively philosophical fulcrums, Turner
is able to demonstrate the advantage of a phil-
osophical perspective for explaining how sci-
ence works the way it does. The result is a
collection of discussions that are able to unite
problems that have arisen in the study of ancient
life with problems that arise in other sciences, a
highly salutary effect for readers interested in
understanding science at an abstract level and
for educators interested in imparting to their
students the generality of certain kinds of prob-
lems across the sciences.
Much of Turner’s book is concerned with
explaining the historical origins and conceptual
foundations of various aspects of theories of
evolution above the species level. These theo-
ries are arguably the most distinctive features of
modern paleontology, and it is appropriate that
Turner devotes the lion’s share of his attention
to them. Two chapters are devoted specifically
to the nature of and debate surrounding Niles
Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould’s punctuated
equilibrium model for understanding patterns in
the fossil record. Turner carefully unpacks what
the model does and does not say, explains how
it put pressure on phyletic gradualism, and ties
the model and its associated controversies to
more general problems in the philosophy of sci-
ence.
Turner’s discussion of punctuated equilib-
rium leads him into an insightful exploration of
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